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Abstract
The analysis of causal effects when the outcome of interest is possibly truncated by death has a long history in
statistics and causal inference. The survivor average causal effect is commonly identified with more assumptions than
those guaranteed by the design of a randomized clinical trial or using sensitivity analysis. This paper demonstrates
that individual level causal effects in the ‘always survivor’ principal stratum can be identified with no stronger
identification assumptions than randomization. We illustrate the practical utility of our methods using data from a
clinical trial on patients with prostate cancer. Our methodology is the first and, as of yet, only proposed procedure
that enables detecting causal effects in the presence of truncation by death using only the assumptions that are
guaranteed by design of the clinical trial.
1 Introduction
Researchers would often like to evaluate the effect of a treatment or exposure on an outcome that could be truncated
by or missing due to death [4, 18, 10]. For individuals who die before the end of study, the outcome of interest
remains undefined. Such issues occur both in clinical trials and in observational studies. Many researchers note
that a comparison of risk differences of those populations that survive at least until the end of the study do not
offer causal conclusions [11, 13, 10]. Studies based upon principal stratification, in which comparisons are made
of average causal effects in the ‘always survivor’ group, attempt to provide causal conclusions in the presence of
truncation by death.
We refer the interested reader to Wang et al [17], who provide a detailed description of the different approaches
with regard to survivor average causal effects. Our approach differs from these previous approaches [3, 17] in that
our causal estimand is not the survivor average causal effect estimand used in these previous papers [3, 17, 4, 18, 16].
Instead, we derive a null hypothesis that when falsified informs us that the ‘always survivor’ principal stratum must
exist and that there are individuals in this principal stratum of ‘always survivors’ for whom the treatment has
an effect of the post-survival outcome of interest. Our approach embeds testing for these causal effects firmly
within the Neyman-Pearson paradigm. The identification assumptions used to detect such effects are exactly those
assumptions made to identify the average treatment effect, that is, we make no identification assumption other than
randomization of treatment.
2 Notation and assumptions
Suppose a binary treatment X ∈ {0, 1} is randomized at baseline. We assume data has been collected over time
on survival and on a binary outcome of interest defined only among those who survive. We assume that censoring
may take place either for survival or for the binary outcome. The individuals of our study, denoted by symbol ω,
compose a finite population Ω. At pre-specified times T = {1, . . . , tf} over the course of the study duration tf , we
define variable S(ω, t) ∈ {0, 1, 2} of an individual ω for each t ∈ T. Here, S(ω, t) = 2 denotes that the individual’s
survival response was censored or missing at time t. If the individual’s response is not censored at time t, then
S(ω, t) = 1 denotes that the individual survived at least until time t, and S(ω, t) = 0 denotes that the individual
did not survive until time t. A binary outcome of primary interest is also measured at each of the pre-specified
times t ∈ T, though at each t ∈ T, the outcome might be truncated through death, that is, undefined because the
individual died. If the individual’s response is censored by time t, then let Y (ω, t) = 3, and if the individual was
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not censored but did not survive until t ∈ T, then let Y (ω, t) = 2. If the individual was not censored and did not
die before time t then let Y (ω, t) = 1 if the binary outcome is present and Y (ω, t) = 0 if the binary outcome is
absent. Consequently the normally binary outcome is transformed to a categorical variable. For this paper, it is
important to note that censoring by time t, denoted as Y (ω, t) = 3, refers to either drop-out of the individual from
the trial or missing data, and that death of an uncensored individual is treated as a different event and is denoted
as Y (ω, t) = 2. If the individual ω survives at least until t ∈ T , then Y (ω, t) = 0 denotes that the primary outcome
of interest is 0 at follow up period t, and Y (ω, t) = 1 denotes that the primary outcome of interest is 1 at follow up
period t. We use this re-coding of the outcome variables Y and S for notational simplicity. However, we also offer
an alternative proof of our results in the online supplement that does not require this re-coding.
Define potential outcomes Yx(ω, t) and Sx(ω, t) to be the value of Y (ω, t) and S(ω, t) respectively at follow up
time t had we set the value of the treatment X to x for individual ω. Similarly, should the individual’s counterfactual
Sx(ω, t) = 0 for t ∈ T, then Yx(ω, t) = 2, and if Sx(ω, t) = 1 for t ∈ T, then Yx(ω, t) is the counterfactual Y (ω, t) had
we forced individual to take treatment x ∈ {0, 1}. Also, for some t ∈ T, let Yx(ω, t) = 3 denote that had we forced
individual to take treatment x ∈ {0, 1} their counterfactual of the primary outcome Y (ω, t) would be censored
or missing to the experimenter in the counterfactual world. Similarly, let Sx(ω, t) = 2 denote that had we forced
individual to take treatment x ∈ {0, 1} their counterfactual of the survival status would be censored or missing to
the experimenter. This setting of potential outcomes or counterfactuals allowing for the possibility of censoring at
a given time t in the counterfactual world provides us with a theoretical framework to examine causal effects in the
presence of censoring and truncation by death.
Consider now the setting of a randomized trial. With treatment randomized at baseline, we can make the
‘weak ignorability’ assumption (Yx(ω, t), Sx(ω, t)) ∐ X for all t ∈ T. We require the consistency assumption for
both Yx(ω, t) and Sx(ω, t), which means that when X(ω) = x, then Yx(ω, t) = Y (ω, t) and Sx(ω, t) = S(ω, t).
This assumption states that the value of Y (ω, t) and S(ω, t) that would be observed if X had been set to what
in fact they were observed to be is equal respectively to the value of Y (ω, t) and S(ω, t) that was observed. The
randomization and consistency assumption are assumed throughout this paper. Additional assumptions, whenever
needed, are explicitly detailed in the relevant section, theorem and proposition.
For ease of notation, we drop the ω in Y (ω, t) and S(ω, t) whenever the meaning is clear. Denote for all
t ∈ T, P c(t)(y1, y0, s1, s0) = P (Y1(t) = y1, Y0(t) = y0, S1(t) = s1, S0(t) = s0), where y1 and y0 take values in the
set {0, 1, 2, 3}, and s1 and s0 that take values in the set {0, 1, 2}. Also, for all t ∈ T, we shall use the notation
P
r(t)
y,s.x = P (Y (t) = y, S(t) = s | X = x) where y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, s ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and x ∈ {0, 1}. The counterfactual
probability P c(t)(y1, y0, s1, s0) is an important quantity for understanding the magnitude of different causal effects,
and is used throughout this paper. The observed probability P
r(t)
y,s.x is used in empirical conditions throughout this
paper. Under the assumption of randomization and consistency of counterfactuals, the empirical conditions that
only use the observed probability P
r(t)
y,x.s imply resulting constraints placed upon P c(t)(y1, y0, s1, s0), which, as we
will show, enables investigators to evaluate the magnitude of causal effects for always survivors using only empirical
conditions from the observed data.
The superscripts are meant to distinguish these probabilities from one another. The symbol c(t) denotes that
this is probability concerns the counterfactual world, and similarly the symbol r(t) denotes that this probability
concerns our observed data or real world. All proofs are provided in the appendix. Let I(·) denote the usual indicator
function. Define Y
[y]
x (ω, t) = I(Yx(ω, t) = y), and S
[s]
x (ω, t) = I(Sx(ω, t) = s) for y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, s ∈ {0, 1, 2}, ω ∈ Ω
and t ∈ T. We say an individual is an ‘always survivor’ at time t if S1(ω, t) = S0(ω, t) = 1, that is the individual
survives at least until time t regardless of treatment. We say that an individual displays an individual level ‘always
survivor causal effect’ at time t, if for such an individual Y1(ω, t) = y, Y0(ω, t) = 1−y, S1(ω, t) = 1, and S0(ω, t) = 1
for y ∈ {0, 1}, which means that this individual would have survived at least until time t regardless of treatment
and there is a causal effect on Y.
Joint counterfactuals of the form Yx(ω, t) = 1 and Sx(ω, t) = 0 are never considered, as the individual ω ∈ Ω
has not survived until time t ∈ T. Consequently, any counterfactual probability P c(t)(y1, y0, s1, s0) for which s1 = 0
and y1 ∈ {0, 1} or s0 = 0 and y0 ∈ {0, 1} is identically zero. Also P
c(t)(y1, y0, s1, s0) = 0 whenever s1 = 2 and
y1 6= 3 or s0 = 2 and y0 6= 3. Similarly, P
r(t)
y,s.x is equal to zero whenever any of the following conditions hold: (1)
s = 2 and y 6= 3; (2) or y = 3 and s 6= 2 (3) or s = 0 and y 6= 2; (4) or y = 2 and s 6= 0. Situations where, at time t,
the realized survival value s is not censored or missing but the realized value y is censored are possible in practice.
However, in our application below, these situations do not occur in our data analysis by design of the clinical trial.
The theoretical framework to accommodate such situations entirely replicates the arguments presented here, and
online supplement fully explicates the framework and results in the setting where there exists individuals ω ∈ Ω for
whom Y (ω, t) is censored but S(ω, t) is not censored for any specified time t.
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3 Identification of individual level always survivor causal effects
Here, we only require randomization and consistency for Theorem 1, Proposition 1, and Corollary 1. In the next
section, we will examine the derivation of similar results in the presence of monotonicity assumptions.
Theorem 1
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. If for some t ∈ T P
r(t)
y,1.1 +P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 > 1 for y ∈ {0, 1}, then there exists a non-
empty subpopulation Ωs ⊆ Ω such that for every ω ∈ Ωs, S1(ω, t) = S0(ω, t) = 1 and Y1(ω, t) = y, Y0(ω, t) = 1− y.
Theorem 1 allows for the empirical detection of individual level total effects within the ‘always survivor’ principal
stratum. A difference between our result and previous methods is that Theorem 1 effectively only requires random-
ization and yet still provides conditions for which the ‘always survivor’ principal stratum exists and has individuals
for whom the treatment changes the outcome. This is the first time an empirical condition to detect causal effects
is formulated in the presence of truncation by death and censoring without any additional assumptions other than
those guaranteed by design of the clinical trial. Proposition 1 provides further context, comparing the proportion
of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors and who display a positive (or negative) effect of
treatment X on an outcome Y to the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors
and who display a negative (or positive) effect of treatment X on outcome Y. Corollary 1 provides further results
for this difference for all individuals in the always survivor principal stratum (observed or censored).
Proposition 1
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. If for some t ∈ T, P
r(t)
y,1.1 + P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 > 1 for y ∈ {0, 1}, then we have the
following result concerning counterfactuals:
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1) > P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1) + P c(t)(2, y, 0, 1) + P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0)
+P c(t)(2, 2, 0, 0) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)
+P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0) + P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2) + P c(t)(2, 3, 0, 2).
Corollary 1
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. The expression P
r(t)
1,1.1 + P
r(t)
0,1.0 − 1 is a lower bound on the risk difference
between the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at
time t for whom the treatment causes the outcome and the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that
are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom the treatment prevents the outcome of interest.
In counterfactual notation, the expression P
r(t)
1,1.1+P
r(t)
0,1.0−1 is a lower bound on P
c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1)−[P c(t)(0, 1, 1, 1)+
P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(3, 1, 2, 1) + P c(t)(0, 3, 1, 2)]. Note P c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1) is a lower bound on the proportion of indi-
viduals randomized at baseline that are always survivors for whom the treatment causes the outcome Y as it does
not count any censored individual that could be an always survivor for whom the treatment causes the outcome Y.
The term in the square brackets is an upper bound on the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that
are always survivors for whom the treatment prevents the outcome Y, because any censored individual that could
possibly be an always survivor at time t for whom the treatment prevents the outcome Y is represented in the
square brackets.
It follows from Corollary 1, the expression max{P
r(t)
1,1.1 + P
r(t)
0,1.0 − 1, 0} is thus a lower bound on the proportion
of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom the
treatment causes the outcome: P c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1). Similarly, the expression P
r(t)
0,1.1 + P
r(t)
1,1.0 − 1 is a lower bound on the
risk difference between the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or
censored) at time t for whom the treatment prevents the outcome and the proportion of individuals randomzied
at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom the treatment causes the outcome
of interest. In counterfactual notation, the expression P
r(t)
0,1.1 + P
r(t)
1,1.0 − 1 is a lower bound on P
c(t)(0, 1, 1, 1) −
[P c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(3, 0, 2, 1) + P c(t)(1, 3, 1, 2)]. The expression max{P
r(t)
0,1.1 + P
r(t)
1,1.0 − 1, 0} is
a lower bound on the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or
censored) at time t for whom the treatment prevents the outcome: P c(t)(0, 1, 1, 1).
Remarkably, without any assumption on the censoring mechanism, we can formulate lower bounds on the
proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors (censored or not) at time t and for whom
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the treatment causes (prevents) the outcome minus the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are
always survivors (censored or not) at time t and for whom the treatment prevents (causes respectively) the outcome.
To the best of our knowledge, no other paper provides empirical conditions to detect causal effects in the presence
of censoring without assumptions on the censoring mechanism. Corollary 1 also gives us a contrast only involving
real-world probabilities corresponding to the minimum proportion of of individuals randomized at baseline that are
always survivors (censored or not) at time t for whom treatment has an effect.
Theorem 1, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 provide scientists with interpretations, under weaker assumptions, that
are not possible in any of the previous approaches [6, 17, 3] to deal with truncation by death. Previous approaches
that examine the survivor average causal effect make more assumptions than randomization and consistency [3, 6,
17]. Bounds on the survivor average causal effect and other causal estimands are discussed in the online supplement.
4 Identification of individual level always survivor causal effects under
monotonicity
Monotonicity assumptions are often employed in methods to evaluate principal stratum direct effects. Recall, we
denote Y
[y]
x (ω, t) = I(Yx(ω, t) = y), and S
[s]
x (ω, t) = I(Sx(ω, t) = s) for y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, s ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and t ∈ T.
Here we will consider additional results under two different monotonicity assumptions. In the first monotonicity
assumption, we will assume S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω and for a pre-specified t ∈ T. Heuristically,
this assumption translates to it being the case that no individual exists who would be alive and not censored at
least until time t when forced to take control, but would be dead and not censored by time t when forced to take
treatment. This means that we do not observe any individual for whom S1(ω, t) = 0 and S0(ω, t) = 1 for the
specified t ∈ T. In the absence of censoring, this assumption is simply that for no individual does the treatment
itself cause death. If treatment is considered to be non-smoking and the control is smoking, scientific literature
might lead us to believe that such an assumption is reasonable to make. Subject matter expertise could provide
guidance for which t ∈ T, S
[0]
1 (ω, t) +S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. If for all ω ∈ Ω, S
[0]
1 (ω, t) +S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 holds for
only for a subset of Ts ⊂ T, then Theorem 2A and Proposition 2A, provided below, applies only for those t ∈ Ts.
While such monotonicity constraints are never verifiable, they are falsifiable, and again can sometimes be justified
with subject matter knowledge.
For the second monotonicity assumption, we shall assume that S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω and for
a pre-specified t ∈ T. Heuristically, this assumption means that there is no individual who would drop out of the
study by time t when forced to take treatment but who would not drop out of the study and is alive when forced
to take control condition (e.g. a prior or older treatment). This means that we do not observe any individual for
whom S1(ω, t) = 2 and S0(ω, t) = 1 for the specified t ∈ T. Again, such monotonicity constraints are falsifiable and
could be judged using subject matter knowledge. For instance, if clinicians believe that the new treatment is less
toxic than the old treatment, then this could provide some evidence that patients might be less disposed to drop
out if they are forced to take the less toxic new treatment in comparison to the more toxic old treatment.
The monotonicity assumption on censoring is weaker than the non-informative censoring that is commonly
used in statistical analysis. Non-informative censoring would have that if an individual ω ∈ Ω is censored under
treatment at any fixed time t ∈ T, denoted S1(ω, t) = 2, then the same individual would be censored under the
control condition at the same fixed time t ∈ T , denoted S0(ω, t) = 2. In contrast, the monotonicity assumption on
censoring, enables statisticians to examine situations where censoring is likely to occur sooner in one of the two
arms than in the other.
We will consider analogous results to Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 when one or both of these monotonicity
assumptions hold. If such monotonicity assumptions are untenable for the population in question, investigators
can still use the empirical conditions provided earlier that do not need any monotonicity assumptions. Causally
interpretable sensitivity analyses are also presented in Section 6 when one or both of the monotonicity assump-
tions do not hold. Such sensitivity analysis provide researchers tools to quantify the consequences of violations of
these assumptions, and also directly consider how each individual in their sample could contribute to the causal
conclusions.
Theorem 2A
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. In addition, suppose that for some t ∈ T, S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for
all ω ∈ Ω. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the empirical condition P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 > 0 holds, then there exists
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a non-empty subpopulation Ωs ⊆ Ω such that for every ω ∈ Ωs, S1(ω, t) = 1, S0(ω, t) = 1 and Y1(ω, t) = y,
Y0(ω, t) = 1− y.
Proposition 2A
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. In addition, suppose that for some t ∈ T, S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all
ω ∈ Ω. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the empirical condition P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 > 0 holds, then we have the
following result concerning counterfactuals:
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1) > P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1) + P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0)
+P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)
+P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0) + P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2)
Corollary 2A
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. In addition, suppose that for some t ∈ T, S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for
all ω ∈ Ω. The expression P
r(t)
0,1.0 − P
r(t)
0,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 is a lower bound on the risk difference between the proportion
of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom the
treatment causes the outcome and the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors
(observed or censored) at time t for whom the treatment prevents the outcome of interest.
The expression max{P
r(t)
0,1.0 − P
r(t)
0,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1, 0} is thus also a lower bound on the proportion of individuals
randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom treatment causes the
outcome. Similarly, the expression P
r(t)
1,1.0 − P
r(t)
1,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 is a lower bound on the risk difference between the
proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for
whom the treatment prevents the outcome and the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that always
survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom the treatment causes the outcome of interest. The expression
max{P
r(t)
1,1.0 − P
r(t)
1,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1, 0} is a lower bound on the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are
always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom treatment prevents the outcome.
The interpretations for Theorem 2A and Proposition 2A are similar to those provided for Theorem 1 and
Proposition 1. Specifically, if we believe that no individual exists that would die and not be censored by time t
when forced to take treatment but would not die and not be censored by time t when forced to take control and
if P
r(t)
0,1.0 − P
r(t)
0,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 > 0, then there exists a set of individuals that would live at least until time t and for
whom the treatment causes outcome. From Corollary 2A, we learn that the proportion of individuals randomized at
baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) until time t and for whom the treatment causes (prevents)
outcome of interest is at least greater the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors
(observed or censored) at time t regardless of treatment assignment and for whom the treatment prevents (causes
respectively) outcome of interest. Also, Corollary 2A provides a contrast involving only real-world probabilities that
is the minimum proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at
time t for whom the treatment causes (or prevents) the outcome. The other monotonicity assumption also provides
useful results and is presented next.
Theorem 2B
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. In addition, suppose that for some t ∈ T, S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for
all ω ∈ Ω. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the empirical condition P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
2,0.1 > 0 holds, then there exists
a non-empty subpopulation Ωs ⊆ Ω such that for every ω ∈ Ωs, S1(ω, t) = 1, S0(ω, t) = 1 and Y1(ω, t) = y,
Y0(ω, t) = 1− y.
Proposition 2B
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. In addition, suppose that for some t ∈ T, S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all
ω ∈ Ω. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the empirical condition P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
2,0.1 > 0 holds, then we have the
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following result concerning counterfactuals:
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1) > P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1) + P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0)
+P c(t)(2, y, 0, 1) + P c(t)(2, 2, 0, 0)
+P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2) + P c(t)(2, 3, 0, 2)
Corollary 2B
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. In addition, suppose that for some t ∈ T, S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all
ω ∈ Ω. The expression max{P
r(t)
0,1.0−P
r(t)
0,1.1−P
r(t)
2,0.1, 0} is a lower bound on the proportion of individuals randomized
at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom treatment causes the outcome.
Similarly, the expression max{P
r(t)
1,1.0 − P
r(t)
1,1.1 − P
r(t)
2,0.1, 0} is a lower bound on the proportion of individuals
randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom treatment prevents the
outcome. The interpretations for Theorem 2B and Proposition 2B are similar to those provided for Theorem 2A
and Proposition 2A. Finally, if we believe that the two monotonicity assumptions hold, then we have the following
result.
Theorem 2C
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. In addition, suppose that for some t ∈ T, S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 and
S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the empirical condition P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 > 0 holds,
then there exists a non-empty subpopulation Ωs ⊆ Ω such that for every ω ∈ Ωs, S1(ω, t) = 1, S0(ω, t) = 1 and
Y1(ω, t) = y, Y0(ω, t) = 1− y.
Proposition 2C
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. In addition, suppose that for some t ∈ T, S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 and
S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the empirical condition P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 > 0 holds,
then we have the following result concerning counterfactuals:
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1) > P c(t)(1 − y, y, 1, 1) + P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0) + P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2)
Corollary 2C
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. In addition, suppose that for some t ∈ T, S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 and
S
[0]
1 (ω, t) +S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. The expression max{P
r(t)
0,1.0−P
r(t)
0,1.1, 0} is a lower bound on the proportion of
individuals at randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom treatment
causes the outcome.
Similarly, the expression max{P
r(t)
1,1.0−P
r(t)
1,1.1, 0} is a lower bound on the proportion of individuals randomized at
baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at time t for whom treatment prevents the outcome. The
interpretations of Theorem, Proposition, and Corollary 2C are similar to those provided for Theorem, Proposition
and Corollary 2B respectively. The conditions are to detect individual level always survivor causal effects are
weaker the more monotonicity assumptions are made. Again, if such monotonicity assumptions cannot be justified
on scientific grounds, investigators can still use the results that do not require such assumptions. The sensitivity
analysis that is presented in Section 6 enables researchers to partially assess the consequences of violations of
such monotonicity assumptions and also check how violations of these monotonicity assumptions impact the causal
findings.
5 Inference for individual level always survivor causal effects
To investigate individual level always survivor causal effects, null hypotheses can be formulated that when falsified
produce the inequalities associated with Theorem 1, 2A, 2B, or 2C. For Theorem 1, if we reject P
r(t)
y,1.1+P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 ≤ 1
for y ∈ {0, 1}, then we conclude with a fixed type one error rate that there exists a non-empty subpopulation Ωs ⊆ Ω
such that for every ω ∈ Ωs, S1(ω, t) = S0(ω, t) = 1 and Y1(ω, t) = y, Y0(ω, t) = 1 − y. Testing P
r(t)
y,1.1 + P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 ≤ 1
is equivalent to testing P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 ≤ P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 + P
r(t)
2,0.1 + P
r(t)
3,2.1, which can also be converted into a one-sided difference
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of proportions. Note testing P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 ≤ P
r(t)
y,1.1. + P
r(t)
2,0.1 + P
r(t)
3,2.1 is equivalent to testing P (Y (t) = 1 − y, S(t) = 1 |
X = 0) ≤ P ({Y (t) = 1− y, S(t) = 1} ∪ {Y (t) = 2, S(t) = 0} ∪ {Y (t) = 3, S(t) = 2} | X = 1).
To use Theorem 2A, if assume S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω and we reject, P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 −
P
r(t)
3,2.1 ≤ 0 for some y ∈ 0, 1, then we conclude with a fixed type one error rate that there exists a non-empty
subpopulation Ωs such that for every ω ∈ Ωs, S1(ω, t) = S0(ω, t) = 1 and Y1(ω, t) = y, Y0(ω, t) = 1 − y. Note
testing P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 ≤ P
r(t)
y,1.1. + P
r(t)
3,2.1 is equivalent to testing P (Y (t) = 1− y, S = 1 | X = 0) ≤ P ({Y (t) = 1− y, S(t) =
1} ∪ {Y (t) = 3, S(t) = 2} | X = 1). Similarly, to use Theorem 2B, if assume S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all
ω ∈ Ω and we reject, P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
2,0.1 ≤ 0 for some y ∈ {0, 1}, then we conclude with a fixed type
one error rate that there exists a non-empty subpopulation Ωs ⊆ Ω such that for every ω ∈ Ωs, S1(ω, t) = 1
S0(ω, t) = 1 and Y1(ω, t) = y, Y0(ω, t) = 1 − y. Note testing P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 ≤ P
r(t)
y,1.1. + P
r(t)
2,0.1 is equivalent to testing
P (Y (t) = 1 − y, S = 1 | X = 0) ≤ P ({Y (t) = 1 − y, S(t) = 1} ∪ {Y (t) = 2, S(t) = 0} | X = 1). Finally, to use
Theorem 2C, if assume and S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 and S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω and we reject,
P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 ≤ 0 for some y ∈ 0, 1, then we conclude with a fixed type one error rate that there exists a
non-empty subpopulation Ωs such that for every ω ∈ Ωs, S1(ω, t) = S0(ω, t) = 1, and Y1(ω, t) = y, Y0(ω, t) = 1− y.
In our data application below we have seven fixed time periods of interest and so we use Theorems 1 seven times
and apply a Bonferroni correction. We also apply Theorem 2A, 2B, 2C arguing that the relevant monotonicity
assumptions likely hold, and demonstrate similar conclusions. Note for the data application, we use the equivalent
test expressed in a one-sided difference of proportions instead of the complement of the inequality associated with
Theorems 1, 2A, 2B, 2C.
The online supplement provides Bayesian and randomization based inferential methods to assess results associ-
ated with Theorem 1, 2A, 2B, 2C. For our data application, we use the standard t-test for a one-sided difference
of proportions to assess always survivor causal effects, because of the moderately large sample size and ease of
implementation for readers. In the setting of smaller sample sizes, the randomization or Bayesian approach might
be more appropriate.
6 Sensitivity analysis for monotonicity assumptions
As demonstrated in Section 3, we provide methods for identification of individual level always survivor causal effects
with only the assumptions guaranteed by design of the clinical trial. Theorem 1, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1
effectively only require randomization at baseline to first detect always survivor causal effects and secondly provide
a population level characterization of such causal effects. Monotonicity assumptions on survival or censoring enable
scientists to detect always survivor causal effects under assumptions that are justified using subject matter knowl-
edge, and can assist researchers to detect always survivor causal effects when the tests without such monotonicity
assumptions are too stringent. Sensitivity analysis can provide scientists and statisticians with methods to interpret
their conclusions when a set of assumptions is not guaranteed by design.
Theorem 3A
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the empirical condition P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 >
dm(t) holds for dm(t) = P
c(t)(2, 1− y, 0, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0)− P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0), then we have the following result
concerning counterfactuals:
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1) > P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1) + P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2).
Corollary 3A
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. For some y ∈ {0, 1}, the expression P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 − dm(t) for
dm(t) = P
c(t)(2, 1− y, 0, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0)− P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0) is equal to
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− [P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1) + P c(t)(1 − y, 3, 1, 2)].
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Theorem 3B
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the empirical condition P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
2,0.1 >
am(t) holds for am(t) = P
c(t)(3, 1−y, 2, 1)−P c(t)(1−y, 2, 1, 0)−P c(t)(1−y, 3, 1, 2)−P c(t)(2, y, 0, 1)−P c(t)(2, 2, 0, 0)−
P c(t)(2, 3, 0, 2), then we have the following result concerning counterfactuals:
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1) > P c(t)(1 − y, y, 1, 1).
Corollary 3B
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the expression P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
2,0.1 − am(t) for
am(t) = P
c(t)(3, 1−y, 2, 1)−P c(t)(1−y, 2, 1, 0)−P c(t)(1−y, 3, 1, 2)−P c(t)(2, y, 0, 1)−P c(t)(2, 2, 0, 0)−P c(t)(2, 3, 0, 2)
is equal to P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1).
Theorem 3C
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the empirical condition P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 > km(t)
holds for km(t) = P
c(t)(2, 1 − y, 0, 1) + P c(t)(3, 1 − y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(1 − y, 2, 1, 0)− P c(t)(1 − y, 3, 1, 2) then we have
the following result concerning counterfactuals:
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1) > P c(t)(1 − y, y, 1, 1).
Corollary 3C
Suppose X is randomized at baseline. If for some y ∈ {0, 1} the expression P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − km(t) for km(t) =
P c(t)(2, 1 − y, 0, 1) + P c(t)(3, 1− y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(1 − y, 2, 1, 0)− P c(t)(1 − y, 3, 1, 2) is equal to P c(t)(y, 1 − y, 1, 1)−
P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1).
Readers should realize that dm(t), am(t) and km(t) are not point identified in randomized studies. A simple, yet
effective, approach for sensitivity analysis would be to first estimate the left hand side of the inequalities associated
with Theorem 3A, Theorem 3B, and Theorem 3C, and then crudely interpret dm(t), am(t), km(t) as the proportion
of individuals of a specific counterfactual form to render the respective inferences associated with Theorem 3A,
3B, 3C to be invalid. As an example, suppose the researcher estimates P
r(t)
0,1.0 − P
r(t)
0,1.1 for a specific t ∈ T as 0.2,
then the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that follow counterfactual response types {ω1, ω2} ∈ Ω
Y1(ω1, t) = 2, Y0(ω1, t) = 1, S1(ω1, t) = 0, S0(ω1, t) = 1 or Y (ω2, t) = 3, Y0(ω2, t) = 0, S1(ω2, t) = 2, S0(ω2, t) = 1
has to be at least 0.2 (possibly significantly greater than 0.2, if P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0) and P c(t)(1 − y, 3, 1, 2) are non-
zero) at time t for there to be no individual of counterfactual response type Y1(ω, t) = 1, Y0(ω, t) = 0, S1(ω, t) = 1,
and S0(ω, t) = 1 in our population.
Corollary 3A, 3B, and 3C provide further context on how violations of individual level monotonicity assumptions
impact the relevant counterfactual proportions. As an example, consider a researcher that estimates P
r(t)
0,1.0−P
r(t)
0,1.1−
P
r(t)
3,2.1 as 0.25 at time t = 1. If the scientist believes that at most five percent of her clinical trial subject’s randomized
at baseline satisfy the following three conditions, (1) not survive when given the new treatment by time t = 1, (2)
survive when given the control condition at least until time t = 1, and (3) not develop the outcome of interest under
the control condition (denoted P c(t)(2, 0, 0, 1) ≤ 0.05), then from Corollary 3A, we know that the proportion of
individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors at least until time t = 1 that would develop outcome
Y under the treatment condition but when prescribed the control condition is at least 0.25− 0.05 = 0.20.
Such sensitivity analysis enables researchers to directly assess either how many individuals of a specific counter-
factual response type need to exist in a population for the detection of individual principal stratum causal effects to
be invalid if a particular monotonicity assumption fails, or how given individual level counterfactual response types
attenuate the always survivor causal effect of interest. Additionally, researchers will develop an understanding of
the individual reasons for trial censoring or death at each particular time in the trial. If a trial subject dies in
a random car crash at time t = 1, then a researcher might have strong arguments to support the belief that the
subjects death had nothing to do with treatment assignment. Such information can be used to choose and refine
suitable values of dm(t), am(t) and km(t) for different times in the study.
Similarly, if the control condition arm experiences a greater number of adverse events (for instance higher
toxicities) for the duration the trial and the rate of censoring is at least as large in the control arm as in the
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treatment arm, then similarly a researcher might have grounds to believe that at particular times in the trial that
P c(t)(3, 1 − y, 2, 1) is less than P c(t)(1 − y, 3, 1, 2). In such situations, the researcher might have solid grounds to
believe that P
r(t)
1−y,1.0−P
r(t)
1−y,1.1−P
r(t)
2,0.1 is fairly close to P
c(t)(y, 1−y, 1, 1)−P c(t)(1−y, y, 1, 1). After unblinding the
trial, researchers might discover that some toxicities only occur in one of the two arms, and that such toxicities cause
the patients to drop out of the study. A careful sensitivity analysis that keeps track of the each individual’s reasons
for drop out or death could provide researchers with greater assurance in detecting always survivor causal effects and
also enable them to further refine the constants km(t) and am(t) that are associated with Theorems and Corollaries
3B and 3C. The data analysis presented below illustrates how such sensitivity analysis can reassure researchers about
the veracity of their scientific findings. Given that clinical trials cost multi-million dollars, researchers should collect
all the information they can on censoring and survival outcomes to make the sensitivity analysis as informative
as possible. But once again, if a researcher does not want to use sensitivity analysis nor impose any assumptions
beyond randomization then Theorem 1, Proposition 1, and Corollary 1 are all still applicable.
7 Application to Southwest Oncology Group Trial
Our results are applied to the data from the Southwest Oncology Group (SWOG) Trial, which was a phase III trial
to compare docetaxal plus estramustine against mitoxantrone plus prednisone in men with metastatic, hormone-
independent prostate cancer [7]. We use software [5] to reconstruct data from the Kaplan-Meir survival curves
presented in the Petrylak et al paper [7]. The reconstructed dataset might be slightly different from those presented
in the original article as a result of measurement error stemming from image analysis of the Kaplan-Meir curves [5].
Similar reconstructed data was analyzed in Ding et al and Wang et al [3, 17]. The purpose of this applied example
is to illustrate the broad utility of our methods to detect causal effects in clinical trials in which an outcome of
interest is truncated by death or censored due to drop out.
For the trial, the primary end-point was overall survival [7]. A total of 338 patients were randomized to the
docetaxal plus estramustine (henceforth referred to as docetaxal), and a total of 336 were randomized to the
mitoxantrone plus prednisone (henceforth referred to as mitoxantrone). The trial found that docetaxal improved
median survival in comparison to mitoxantrone [7]. Progression of cancer is an important secondary outcome of
interest and may be subject to truncation by death. Our hypothesis is that for some pre-specified times t ∈ TSWOG,
the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline who would remain alive regardless of treatment at least until
the pre-specified time t and whose cancer would progress under mitoxantrone but not under docetaxal at time t is
greater than the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline who would remain alive regardless of treatment
at least until the pre-specified time t and whose cancer would progress under docetaxal but not under mitoxantrone
at time t. Such a hypothesis can be evaluated using our results, but no previous approach could answer such a
question using only the set of assumptions guaranteed by design.
The time periods are 1 month (t = 1), 2 months (t = 2), 3 months (t = 3), 4 months (t = 4), 6 months
(t = 5), 12 months (t = 6), and 18 months (t = 7) post treatment initiation. Here, X = 1 denotes that the
individual was randomized to the docetaxal arm, and X = 0 denotes that the individual was randomized to the
mitoxantrone arm. Outcome Y (t) is defined as a categorical variable that takes values in the set {0, 1, 2, 3} for
each t ∈ TSWOG = {1, . . . , 7}, where Y (t) = 0 means that the individual’s cancer did not progress at time point t,
Y (t) = 1 means that the individual’s cancer progressed at time point t, Y (t) = 2 means that the individual did not
survive until time t, and finally Y (t) = 3 means that the individual’s observation was censored or missing at time
t. Survival status at time t, denoted S(t) is also defined as a categorical variable that takes value in the set {0, 1, 2}
for each t ∈ TSWOG, where S(t) = 0 means that the individual did not survive at time period t, S(t) = 1 means
that the individual survived to at least time period t, and S(t) = 2 means that the individual’s survival status is
censored or missing at time period t. We provide the relevant contingency tables in the appendix and sample R
code that is used to produce all our results in the online supplement.
7.1 Data Analysis without monotonicity assumptions
Without any monotonicity assumptions, we need to test P
r(t)
0,1.1 + P
r(t)
1,1.0 ≤ 1 for each t ∈ {1, . . . , 7} to evaluate
at each time point whether there exist individuals for whom S1(ω, t) = S0(ω, t) = 1, Y1(ω, t) = 0, Y0(ω, t) = 1,
that is these, individuals would survive at least until time t regardless of treatment, but treatment with docetaxal
(vs. mitoxantrone) would prevent their cancer from progressing. This hypothesis test is equivalent to testing
P
r(t)
1,1.0 ≤ P
r(t)
1,1.1 + P
r(t)
2,0.1 + P
r(t)
3,2.1. To conduct this hypothesis test, we provide the following three contingency tables:
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1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
X = 1 6 28 60 81 108 143 102
X = 0 37 94 142 145 155 129 93
Table 1: Survive and cancer progression at each t ∈ TSWOG, (S(t) = 1, Y (t) = 1)
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
X = 1 2 5 8 11 16 33 61
X = 0 2 5 8 11 17 35 52
Table 2: Censored at t ∈ TSWOG, (Y (t) = 3, S(t) = 2):
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
X = 1 2 8 13 20 38 87 155
X = 0 4 10 16 26 48 116 176
Table 3: Did not survive until t ∈ TSWOG, (Y (t) = 2, S(t) = 0):
Two-sided confidence intervals for P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1 | X = 0) − P ({Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1} ∪ {Y (t) = 3, S(t) =
2} ∪ {Y (t) = 2, S(t) = 0} | X = 1) and one-sided p-values for Wald test of the null hypothesis P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) =
1 | X = 0)−P ({Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1}∪ {Y (t) = 3, S(t) = 2}∪ {Y (t) = 2, S(t) = 0} | X = 1) ≤ 0 are provided below:
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
Estimate 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.10 -0.018 -0.39 -0.66
95% CI (0.04, 0.12) (0.10, 0.22) (0.11, 0.26) (0.02, 0.18) (−0.10, 0.06) (−0.47,−0.32) (−0.72,−0.61)
99% CI (0.03, 0.13) (0.08, 0.24) (0.09, 0.28) (0.00, 0.20) (−0.12, 0.08) (−0.49,−0.30) (−0.74,−0.59)
p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0047 0.652 1 1
Table 4: Results without monotonicity assumptions
The results from Table 4 demonstrate by Corollary 1 for the Southwest Oncology Group Trial, that there
is statistical evidence (even after Bonferonni correction for multiple testing with a treshold of 0.05/7 = 0.007)
suggesting that the proportion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored)
at one month post treatment initiation whose cancer would not progress on docetaxal but would progress on
mitoxantrone is greater by 0.08 with a 95 percent confidence interval of (0.04, 0.12) than the proportion of individuals
randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) at one month post treatment initiation
whose cancer would progress on docetaxal but would not progress on mitoxantrone. We do not find evidence for such
individual level always survivor causal effects from 6 months onwards. At three months, statistical evidence suggests
that the proportion individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors three months post treatment
initiation whose cancer would not progress on docetaxal but would on mitoxantrone is at least 0.18 with a 95 percent
confidence interval of (0.11, 0.26). Note that this is a lower bound of such individuals, and with randomization alone
this proportion is not point identified. In terms of the 336+338 = 674 individuals that were enrolled in this clinical
trial, our estimate is that at least 0.18 · 674 = 121 of these individuals would survive until 3 months regardless of
which treatment arm they were randomized and their cancer would progress under mitoxantrone but not docetaxal.
If we interpret the confidence interval as a Bayesian credible interval, then 95 percent of the time we should expect
between 74 to 176 of our clinical trial subjects randomized at baseline to live at least until 3 months after treatment
initiation and within the first three months their cancer should progress under mitoxantrone but not docetaxal.
The conclusions drawn in this data analysis could not be made with any of the previous methods that used
principal stratification to deal with truncation by death [3, 17]. Two papers [3, 17] have used similar data and
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were unable to draw such conclusions [3, 17]. Note also that these other papers, in contrast to ours, made more
assumptions than those guaranteed by randomization alone. We are able to draw conclusions here even with weaker
assumption because of the focus, not on the survivor average causal effect, but rather detecting individuals who
were always survivors for whom treatment had a causal effect on cancer progression.
7.2 Data analysis with monotonicity assumption S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1
For each t ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, we test the null hypothesis P
r(t)
1,1.0 ≤ P
r(t)
1,1.1 + P
r(t)
3,2.1 to evaluate for a fixed t whether the
proportion of individuals for whom Y1(ω, t) = 0, Y0(t, ω) = 1, S1(t, ω) = 1, and S0(t, ω) = 1 is greater than the
proportion of individuals for whom Y1(ω, t) = 1, Y0(ω, t) = 0, S1(ω, t) = 1, and S0(ω, t) = 1 under the assumption
that S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ TSWOG. The following table provides 95% and 99% confidence
intervals for P
r(t)
1,1.0 − P
r(t)
1,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 for each t ∈ TSWOG. Notice P (S(t) = 0 | X = 1) + P (S(t) = 1 | X = 0) ≤ 1 for
all t ∈ TSWOG and therefore we fail to falsify the monotonicity assumption, though of course this does not guarantee
that the assumption holds.
Two-sided confidence intervals of P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1 | X = 0)− P ({Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1} ∪ {Y (t) = 3, S(t) =
2} | X = 1) and p-values for Wald test of the null hypothesis P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1 | X = 0)− P ({Y (t) = 1, S(t) =
1} ∪ {Y (t) = 3, S(t) = 2} | X = 1) ≤ 0 are provided below:
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
Estimate 0.09 0.18 0.22 0.16 0.09 -0.14 -0.21
95% CI (0.05, 0.13) (0.12, 0.24) (0.15, 0.29) (0.09, 0.23) (0.02, 0.17) (−0.21,−0.5) (−0.28,−0.13)
99% CI (0.03, 0.14) (0.10, 0.26) (0.13, 0.31) (0.06, 0.26) (−0.01, 0.19) (−0.24,−0.04) (−0.30,−0.11)
p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.008 0.998 1
Table 5: Results Monotonicity S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω
For this section, we have assumed that S
[0]
1 (ω, t)+S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all t ∈ TSWOG. Notice with this assumption,
we have the same conclusions as before regarding always survivors between one to four months, and now also have
statistical evidence for individual level always survivor causal effects at six months.
By sensitivity analysis Theorem 3A, in order for the inference of detecting always survivors six months post
treatment initiation whose cancer would not progress on docetaxal but would on mitoxantrone to be invalid, we
would need at least 9 percent of our study population at baseline to follow the counterfactual response S1(ω, t) = 0,
S0(ω, t) = 1, and Y1(ω, t) = 2, Y0(ω, t) = 0 for t = 5, that is at least 9 percent of our population randomized at
baseline would need to die within six months if they were prescribed docetaxal but would survive with a cancer
that has not progressed at least until six months post treatment initiation if prescribed mitoxantrone.
7.3 Data analysis with monotonicity assumption S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1
For each t ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, we test the null hypothesis P
r(t)
1,1.0 ≤ P
r(t)
1,1.1 + P
r(t)
2,0.1 to evaluate for a fixed t whether the
proportion of individuals for whom Y1(ω, t) = 0, Y0(t, ω) = 1, S1(t, ω) = 1, and S0(t, ω) = 1 is greater than the
proportion of individuals for whom Y1(ω, t) = 1, Y0(ω, t) = 0, S1(ω, t) = 1, and S0(ω, t) = 1 under the assumption
that S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ TSWOG. The following table provides 95% and 99% confidence
intervals for P
r(t)
1,1.0−P
r(t)
1,1.1−P
r(t)
2,0.1 for each t ∈ TSWOG. Notice that P (S(t) = 2 | X = 1)+P (S(t) = 1 | X = 0) ≤ 1
for all t ∈ TSWOG, though of course this does not guarantee that the assumption holds.
Two-sided confidence intervals of P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1 | X = 0)− P ({Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1} ∪ {Y (t) = 2, S(t) =
0} | X = 1) and one-sided p-values for Wald test of the null hypothesis P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1 | X = 0)− P ({Y (t) =
1, S(t) = 1} ∪ {Y (t) = 2, S(t) = 0} | X = 1) ≤ 0 are provided below:
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1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
Estimate 0.09 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.03 -0.30 -0.48
95% CI (0.05, 0.13) (0.11, 0.23) (0.14, 0.28) (0.06, 0.21) (−0.05, 0.11) (−0.37,−0.22) (−0.55, 0.41)
99% CI (0.03, 0.14) (0.09, 0.25) (0.11, 0.30) (0.03, 0.23) (−0.07, 0.13) (−0.39,−0.20) (−0.57,−0.39)
p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0002 0.245 1 1
Table 6: Results Monotonicity S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω
Under the assumption of monotonicity for censoring, we find evidence for individual principal stratum causal
effects up to 4 months but not beyond.
7.4 Data analysis with monotonicity assumptions S
[2]
1 (ω, t)+S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 and S
[0]
1 (ω, t)+
S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1
For each t ∈ {1, . . . , 7}, we test the null hypothesis P
r(t)
1,1.0 ≤ P
r(t)
1,1.1 to evaluate for a different fixed t whether
the proportion of individuals for whom Y1(ω, t) = 0, Y0(t, ω) = 1, S1(t, ω) = 1, and S0(t, ω) = 1 is greater
than the proportion of individuals for whom Y1(ω, t) = 1, Y0(ω, t) = 0, S1(ω, t) = 1, and S0(ω, t) = 1 under
the assumption that S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 and S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ TSWOG. The
following table provides 95% and 99% confidence intervals for P
r(t)
1,1.0 − P
r(t)
1,1.1 for each t ∈ TSWOG. As before, notice
P (S(t) = 0 | X = 1) + P (S(t) = 1 | X = 0) ≤ 1 and P (S(t) = 2 | X = 1) + P (S(t) = 1 | X = 0) ≤ 1 for all
t ∈ TSWOG and therefore we fail to falsify the monotonicity assumption, though of course this does not guarantee
that the assumption holds.
Two-sided confidence intervals of P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1 | X = 0)− P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1 | X = 1) and one-sided
p-values for Wald test of the null hypothesis P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1 | X = 0) − P (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1 | X = 1) ≤ 0
are provided below:
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
Estimate 0.09 0.20 0.25 0.19 0.14 -0.04 -0.02
95% CI (0.05, 0.13) (0.14, 0.26) (0.18, 0.31) (0.12, 0.26) (0.07, 0.22) (−0.12, 0.03) (−0.10, 0.05)
99% CI (0.04, 0.14) (0.12, 0.27) (0.15, 0.34) (0.10, 0.29) (0.04, 0.24) (−0.14, 0.06) (−0.12, 0.07)
p-value < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0001 0.831 0.736
Table 7: Results Monotonicity S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 and S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω
Under the assumption of monotonicity for censoring and survival, statistical evidence suggests that the propor-
tion of individuals randomized at baseline that are always survivors three months post treatment initiation whose
cancer would not progress on docetaxal but would on mitoxantrone is at least 0.25 with a 95 percent confidence
interval of (0.18, 0.31). Additionally, we again have statistical evidence for individual principal stratum causal effects
up to 6 months but not beyond. Sensitivity analysis could also be applied to the results using Theorem 3C and
Corollary 3C.
8 Conclusion
This work demonstrates that testing for individual causal effects within ‘always survivor’ principal stratum can
be conducted with simply the identification assumptions for a non-zero total effect. The identifiability assump-
tions we use to identify these individual level always survivor causal effects are no stronger than randomization.
Consequently, our results embeds testing for individual level always survivor causal effects firmly within the Neyman-
Pearson paradigm. We also enable statistician to assess the existence of such individual level always survivor causal
effects using randomization based and Bayesian inference as described in the online supplement. Previous literature
required stronger assumptions to identify or provide bounds for survivor average causal effect, which is a different
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causal estimand of interest. We discuss the similarity between our theorems on detecting individual level always
survivor causal effects and previous literature on detecting individual level causal effects for sufficient cause inter-
action [15, 8, 14] and the binary instrumental variable model [1, 2, 9, 12] in the online supplement. Our results are
generally applicable to clinical trials in the situation where an outcome of interest is potentially not observed when
death of the individual occurs prior to the end of study. Our identifiability assumptions are guaranteed by design
in a randomized trial. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time causal effects are detected in always
survivors without any assumption regarding the censoring mechanism.
Our proposed methodology provides a procedure to evaluate whether a new treatment would delay cancer
progression. The effect of a new treatment on overall survival is a different scientific question than whether new
treatment delays cancer progression. Our data analysis demonstrates the usefulness of our methods in this setting.
In oncology trials, determining treatment effectiveness sooner rather than later can extend and improve patient
lives as the progression to mortality for many type III cancers can be rapid. Our methodology is the first and, as
of yet, only proposed procedure that enables detecting causal effects in the presence of truncation by death and
censoring using only the assumptions that are guaranteed by design of the clinical trial.
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Appendix
Let I(·) denote the usual indicator function. Define Y
[y]
x (ω, t) = I(Yx(ω, t) = y), and S
[s]
x (ω, t) = I(Sx(t, ω) = s) for
y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, s ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and t ∈ T. Also note Y
[y]
x (ω, t)S
[s]
x (ω, t) = I(Yx(ω, t) = y, Sx(ω, t) = s) as a property
of indicator functions. For ease of notation and space considerations, we drop the ω in Y (ω, t), S(ω, t), Yx(ω, t),
Sx(ω, t), whenever the meaning is clear. The main paper and appendix assumes deterministic counterfactuals. The
online supplement provides the same results with stochastic counterfactuals and derives the same results. The online
supplement also provides results for the situation where there exists individuals ω whose variable S(ω, t) observed
at time t, but the outcome Y (ω, t) is censored. Table 8 presented after the proofs is used for all our proofs.
Proofs of identification of individual level always survivor causal effects effects
We first present the proofs of identification of individual level always survivor causal effects.
Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the contrapositive. Assume that no individual ω of response type Y1(ω, t) = y, Y0(ω, t) = 1−y, S1(ω, t) = 1
and S0(ω, t) = 1 exists in our population for a fixed t ∈ T and y ∈ {0, 1}. Then for all individuals ω in our population
Ω, I(Y1(ω, t) = y, S1(ω, t) = 1) + I(Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S0(ω, t) = 1) ≤ 1. Taking expectations,
P (Y1(ω, t) = y, S1(ω, t) = 1) + P (Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S0(ω, t) = 1) ≤ 1 ⇐⇒
P (Y1(ω, t) = y, S1(ω, t) = 1 | X = 0) + P (Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S0(ω, t) = 1 | X = 1) ≤ 1 ⇐⇒
P (Y (t) = y, S(t) = 1 | X = 0)− P (Y (t) = 1− y, S(t) = 1 | X = 1) ≤ 1.
The first to second line follows from (Yx(t), Sx(t))∐X for all t and the second to third line follows from consistency
of counterfactuals. The same proof applies for any arbitrary t ∈ T.
Proof of Proposition 1
For any fixed t ∈ T, taking expectation of Y
[1]
1 (ω, t)S
[1]
1 (ω, t) + Y
[0]
0 (ω, t)S
[1]
0 (ω, t) − 1 and Y
[0]
1 (ω, t)S
[1]
1 (ω, t) +
Y
[1]
0 (ω, t)S
[1]
1 (ω, t)−1 gives the result. A table with the relevant frequencies of the counterfactuals is provided below
in Table 8 (see also Tables 1.3s in the online supplement to avoid computation). The same proof applies for any
arbitrary t ∈ T.
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Proof of Corollary 1
For any fixed t ∈ T, consider from arguments presented in Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 (see Tables 1.3s and 1.4s
in the online supplement),
P
r(t)
y,1.1 + P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − 1 = E [I(Y1(ω, t) = y, S1(ω, t) = 1) + I(Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S0(ω, t) = 1)− 1]
= P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(2, y, 0, 1)
− P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0)− P c(t)(2, 2, 0, 0)− P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0)− P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2)
− P c(t)(2, 3, 0, 2).
Therefore,
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)
− P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2)− P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2)
=
P
r(t)
y,1.1 + P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − 1
+ P c(t)(2, y, 0, 1) + P c(t)(1 − y, 2, 1, 0)
+ P c(t)(2, 2, 0, 0)
+ P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0) + P c(t)(2, 3, 0, 2).
Consequently,
P
r(t)
y,1.1 + P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − 1 < P
c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2)
− P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2).
This demonstrates P
r(t)
1,1.1 + P
r(t)
0,1.0 − 1 serves as a lower bound for the counterfactual contrast
P c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1)−
[
P c(t)(0, 1, 1, 1) + P c(t)(3, 1, 2, 1) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(0, 3, 1, 2)
]
.
The first term in this counterfactual contrast, P c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1), is a lower bound of the proportion of individuals
randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) and for whom the treatment causes the
outcome, because it does not include any censored individuals that are also always survivors and for whom the
treatment causes the outcome. The term in the square brackets is an upper bound on the proportion of individual
randomized at baseline that are always survivors (observed or censored) for whom the treatment prevents the
outcome, because it effectively treats any censored individual that could possibly be an always survivor and for
whom the treatment prevents the outcome is actually an always survivor and for whom the treatment prevents the
outcome. To see that P
r(t)
1,1.1 + P
r(t)
0,1.0 − 1 serves as a lower bound to P
c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1), note
P
r(t)
1,1.1 + P
r(t)
0,1.0 − 1 ≤ P
c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1)−
[
P c(t)(0, 1, 1, 1) + P c(t)(3, 1, 2, 1) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(0, 3, 1, 2)
]
=⇒
P
r(t)
1,1.1 + P
r(t)
0,1.0 − 1 ≤ P
c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1).
The proofs of the other bounds are similar. The same proof applies for any arbitrary t ∈ T. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 2A
We prove the contrapositive. For a fixed t ∈ T, assume that no individual ω of response type Y1(ω, t) = 1,
Y0(ω, t) = 0, S1(ω, t) = 1 and S0(ω, t) = 1 exists in our population. Then for all individuals ω in our population Ω,
I(Y0(ω, t) = 0, S0(ω, t) = 1) − I(Y1(ω, t) = 0, S1(ω, t) = 1) − I(Y1(ω, t) = 3, S1(ω, t) = 2) ≤ 0. This last assertion
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is true after examining the counterfactual table provided in tables 2.1s-2.3s in the online supplement. Taking
expectations, we have
P (Y0(ω, t) = 0, S0(ω, t) = 1)− P (Y1(ω, t) = 0, S1(ω, t) = 1)− P (Y1(ω, t) = 3, S1(ω, t) = 2) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒
P (Y0(t) = 0, S0(t) = 1 | X = 0)− P (Y1(t) = 0, S1(t) = 1 | X = 1)− P (Y1(t) = 3, S1(t) = 2 | X = 1) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒
P (Y (t) = 0, S(t) = 1 | X = 0)− P (Y (t) = 0, S(t) = 1 | X = 1)− P (Y (t) = 3, S(t) = 2 | X = 1) ≤ 0.
The first to second line follows from (Yx(t), Sx(t)) ∐ X and the second to third line follows from consistency of
counterfactuals. The same proof applies for any arbitrary t ∈ T. The other inequality associated with Theorem 2A
can be derived similarly. This completes the proof.
The proofs of Theorem 2B and 2C can be derived similarly.
Proof of Proposition 2A
For a fixed integer t ∈ T, taking expectation of Y
[1]
0 (ω, t)S
[1]
0 (ω, t) − Y
[1]
1 (ω, t)S
[1]
1 (ω, t) − Y
[3]
1 (ω, t)S
[2]
1 (ω, t) and
Y
[0]
0 (ω, t)S
[1]
0 (ω, t) − Y
[0]
1 (ω, t)S
[1]
1 (ω, t) − Y
[3]
1 (ω, t)S
[2]
1 (ω, t) gives the result. A table with the relevant frequencies
of the counterfactuals is provided below. In Table 8, set any probability that does not satisfy the monotonicity
assumption S
[1]
1 (ω, t) + S
[0]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 to zero. The same proof applies for any arbitrary t ∈ T. This completes the
proof.
The proofs of Proposition 2B and 2C can be derived similarly.
Proof of Corollary 2A
For a fixed t ∈ T, from Table 8 (see also Table 2.3s in the online supplement to avoid computation), baseline
randomization and consistency of counterfactuals, we have
P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1
= E [I(Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S0(ω, t) = 1)− I(Y1(ω, t) = 1− y, S1(ω, t) = 1)− I(Y1(ω, t) = 3, S1(ω, t) = 2)]
= P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)
− P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0)− P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0)− P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2)
Therefore,
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2)
= P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1
+ P c(t)(1 − y, 2, 1, 0) + P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0).
Consequently,
P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 < P
c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2)
− P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2).
This demonstrates P
r(t)
0,1.0 − P
r(t)
0,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 serves as a lower bound for the counterfactual contrast
P c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1)−
[
P c(t)(0, 1, 1, 1) + P c(t)(3, 1, 2, 1) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(0, 3, 1, 2)
]
.
The first term in this counterfactual contrast, P c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1), is a lower bound of the proportion of individuals that
are always survivors (observed or censored) and for whom the treatment causes the outcome, because it does not
include any censored individuals that are also always survivors and for whom the treatment causes the outcome.
The term in the square brackets is an upper bound on the always survivors (observed or censored) for whom the
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treatment prevents the outcome, because it effectively treats any censored individual that could possibly be an
always survivor and for whom the treatment prevents the outcome is actually an always survivor and for whom the
treatment prevents the outcome. To see that P
r(t)
0,1.0 −P
r(t)
0,1.1−P
r(t)
3,2.1 serves as a lower bound to P
c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1), note
P
r(t)
0,1.0 − P
r(t)
0,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 ≤ P
c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1)−
[
P c(t)(0, 1, 1, 1) + P c(t)(3, 1, 2, 1) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2) + P c(t)(0, 3, 1, 2)
]
=⇒
P
r(t)
0,1.0 − P
r(t)
0,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 ≤ P
c(t)(1, 0, 1, 1).
The proofs of the other bounds are similar. The same proof applies for any arbitrary t ∈ T. This completes the
proof.
The proofs of Corollary 2B and 2C can be derived similarly.
Proofs involving sensitivity analysis
We now present the proofs for the sensitivity analysis of monotonicity assumptions.
Proof of Theorem 3A
For a fixed t ∈ T, from Table 8 (see also Table 2.3s in the online supplement to avoid computation), we have under
consistency of counterfactuals and baseline randomization,
P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1
= E [I(Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S0(ω, t) = 1)− I(Y1(ω, t) = 1− y, S1(ω, t) = 1)− I(Y1(ω, t) = 3, S1(ω, t) = 2)]
= P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)
− P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0)− P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0)
− P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2) + P c(t)(2, 1− y, 0, 1).
Therefore,
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(1 − y, 3, 1, 2) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2)
= P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1
+ P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0) + P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0)− P c(t)(2, 1− y, 0, 1)
Consequently, if
P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1 > dm(t),
where
dm(t) = P
c(t)(2, 1− y, 0, 1)− P c(t)(1 − y, 2, 1, 0)− P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0),
then,
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2)− P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2)
> 0
The same proof applies for any arbitrary t ∈ T. This completes the proof.
An alternative proof would examine
E [I(Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S0(ω, t) = 1)− I(Y1(ω, t) = 1− y, S1(ω, t) = 1)− I(Y1(ω, t) = 3, S1(ω, t) = 2)]
= P (Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S0(ω, t) = 1)− P (Y1(ω, t) = 1− y, S1(ω, t) = 1)− P (Y1(ω, t) = 3, S1(ω, t) = 2),
and then expand P (Y0(ω, t) = 1−y, S0(ω, t) = 1), P (Y1(ω, t) = 1−y, S1(ω, t) = 1), and P (Y1(ω, t) = 3, S1(ω, t) = 2)
over the remaining counterfactual variables. For example,
P (Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S0(ω, t) = 1) =
∑
(y1,s1)∈{(Y1,S1)}
P (Y1(ω, t) = y1, Y0(ω, t) = 1− y, S1(ω, t) = s1, S0(ω, t) = 1).
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Here, {(Y1, S1)} denotes the joint compatible state space of the joint variables Y1(ω, t) and S1(ω, t). Explicitly, in
our context, {(Y1, S1)} = {(0, 1), (1, 1), (2, 0), (3, 2)} is the state of compatible realizations of the joint counterfactual
random variable (Y1, S1). Section 5 and 8 of the online supplement provides this proof using stochastic counterfac-
tuals. This alternative proof is too long and indirect for the main paper. For our purposes, the more direct proof
using Table 8 (or Table 2.3s in the online supplement) is easier to present and explain to readers.
Proof of Corollary 3A
From the proof of Theorem 3A, we have
P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, 3, 1, 2) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2)
= P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P
r(t)
3,2.1
+ P c(t)(1 − y, 2, 1, 0) + P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0)− P c(t)(2, 1− y, 0, 1).
Take dm(t) = P
c(t)(2, 1− y, 0, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, 2, 1, 0)− P c(t)(3, 2, 2, 0), then, we have
P
r(t)
1−y,1.0 − P
r(t)
1−y,1.1 − P3,2.1 − dm(t)
= P c(t)(y, 1− y, 1, 1)− P c(t)(1− y, y, 1, 1)
− P c(t)(3, y, 2, 1)− P c(t)(1 − y, 3, 1, 2) + P c(t)(3, 3, 2, 2).
The same proof applies for any arbitrary t ∈ T. This completes the proof.
An alternative proof using stochastic counterfactuals is presented in Section 8 of the online supplement. The
proofs of Theorems 3B and 3C and Corollaries 3B and 3C are similar and given in the online supplement.
Associated Tables
The tables drop the explicit dependence on ω and integer t ∈ T, and use the shorthand Yx(ω, t) = Yx and Sx(ω, t) =
Sx for x ∈ {0, 1} out of space considerations. Recall that we denote Y
[y]
x (ω, t) = I(Yx(ω, t) = y), and S
[s]
x (ω, t) =
I(Sx(ω, t) = s) for y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and s ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Likewise, we drop the dependence on ω and t, and use shorthand
notation S
[s]
x and Y
[y]
x instead of S
[s]
x (ω, t) and Y
[y]
x (ω, t) for y ∈ {0, 1} out of space considerations. The reader
should always assume that all counterfactuals presented in the tables below are implicitly dependent on ω and t
even if the shorthand notation does not explicitly indicate such a dependence. The tables below provide a complete
enumeration of the different counterfactual response types. Without monotonicity assumptions there are 16 different
counterfactual response types, and then with the monotonicity assumption that S
[0]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 for all
individuals in our population, the response types ω ∈ {5, 6} are no longer possible. Under monotonicity assumption
that S
[2]
1 (ω, t) + S
[1]
0 (ω, t) ≤ 1 response types ω ∈ {11, 12} in Table 8 are no longer possible.
All of our results can be derived using Table 8 only, but we provide further tables in the online supplement that
could aid readers. The table below is for any fixed t ∈ T. The counterfactual table presented below is the joint dis-
tribution of (Y1(ω, t), Y0(ω, t), S1(ω, t), S0(ω, t)), where all joint counterfactuals (Y1(ω, t), Y0(ω, t), S1(ω, t), S0(ω, t))
are measured at the same fixed t ∈ T.
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ω Y1 Y0 S1 S0 Probability
1 1 1 1 1 P (Y1 = 1, Y0 = 1, S1 = 1, S0 = 1)
2 0 1 1 1 P (Y1 = 0, Y0 = 1, S1 = 1, S0 = 1)
3 1 0 1 1 P (Y1 = 1, Y0 = 0, S1 = 1, S0 = 1)
4 0 0 1 1 P (Y1 = 0, Y0 = 0, S1 = 1, S0 = 1)
5 2 1 0 1 P (Y1 = 2, Y0 = 1, S1 = 0, S0 = 1)
6 2 0 0 1 P (Y1 = 2, Y0 = 0, S1 = 0, S0 = 1)
7 1 2 1 0 P (Y1 = 1, Y0 = 2, S1 = 1, S0 = 0)
8 0 2 1 0 P (Y1 = 0, Y0 = 2, S1 = 1, S0 = 0)
9 2 2 0 0 P (Y1 = 2, Y0 = 2, S1 = 0, S0 = 0)
10 3 3 2 2 P (Y1 = 3, Y0 = 3, S1 = 2, S0 = 2)
11 3 1 2 1 P (Y1 = 3, Y0 = 1, S1 = 2, S0 = 1)
12 3 0 2 1 P (Y1 = 3, Y0 = 0, S1 = 2, S0 = 1)
13 3 2 2 0 P (Y1 = 3, Y0 = 2, S1 = 2, S0 = 0)
14 1 3 1 2 P (Y1 = 1, Y0 = 3, S1 = 1, S0 = 2)
15 0 3 1 2 P (Y1 = 0, Y0 = 3, S1 = 1, S0 = 2)
16 2 3 0 2 P (Y1 = 2, Y0 = 3, S1 = 0, S0 = 2)
Table 8: Counterfactual Distribution
Data
A total of 338 individuals were randomized to Docetaxal and 336 individuals were randomized to Mitoxantrone.
The full dataset is provided here to enable reproducibility of our results.
Survive and Cancer Progression
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
X = 1 6 28 60 81 108 143 102
X = 0 37 94 142 145 155 129 93
Table 9: Survive and cancer progression at time t (Y (t) = 1, S(t) = 1)
Survive and Cancer Did not Progress
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
X = 1 328 297 257 226 176 75 20
X = 0 293 227 170 154 116 56 15
Table 10: Survive and cancer does not progress at time t, (Y (t) = 0, S(t) = 1)
Did not Survive
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
X = 1 2 8 13 20 38 87 155
X = 0 4 10 16 26 48 116 176
Table 11: Did not survive until t, (Y (t) = 2, S(t) = 0)
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Censored
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 6 months 12 months 18 months
X = 1 2 5 8 11 16 33 61
X = 0 2 5 8 11 17 35 52
Table 12: Censored at time t, (Y (t) = 3, S(t) = 2)
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